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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Volume 46, Number 3, 1971

REMEDIES FOR RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT: A COMPARATIVE
EVALUATION OF FORUMS
Cornelius J. Peck*
Enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, with a provision for the
awarding of attorneys' fees, opened new opportunities for attorneys in private practice
to represent victims of employment discrimination.Within recent years the Act has been
predominate in litigation involving racial discriminaton in employment, but imaginative
attorneys appealing to innovative courts have used other statutory and common laow
sources for fashioning relief. The 1866 Civil Rights Act, by analogy to its recent application to discriminatory housing practices, offers an important remedy against racial discrimination to employees. It also promises a protection, not found in Title VII, to
employers who are willing to eradicate racial discrimination despite protests of unions.
Individuals discriminated against may find relief in other forums traditionally used for
purposes other than that of preventing racial discrimination in employment.

Racial discrimination poses a problem so difficult and aggravating
as to constitute a major threat to the preservation of American society
and its formally stated ideals. A study of discrimination in employment
exposes the monumental proportions of the problem.' Elimination of
planned and unplanned discrimination in employment is a crucial step
in breaking down the intricate pattern which perpetuates currently
practiced discrimination. Without adequate employment opportunities
the victims of racial discrimination are unable to afford adequate housing, education or training, and the minority group fails to produce its
proportion of the whole society's success models. As a result, group
characteristics of lack of education, -training, or standards of perfor* Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.S. 1944, Harvard University;
Certificate 1945, Harvard Business School; LL.B. 1949, Harvard.
1. For an excellent discussion of the problems posed for our society from racial discrimination, See generally Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the
Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363 (1966). Comprehensive consideration of the problems of racial discrimination in employment may be found
in M. Sovran, LEGAL REsTRAnmS ON RAcIAL DISC ImATiox N EMPOY ENT (1966);
P. NORcREN & S. Himi, TowAD FAiR ENPLOYMENT (1964).
An earlier comparable review of various avenues for obtaining relief from racial
discrimination in employment may be found in Kovarsky, The Negro and Fair Employment, 56 Ky. Q. 757 (1968).
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mance are attributed to each member of the racial minority; the
discrimination thus practiced produces inadequate employment opportunities; and the perpetuating pattern further reduces the ability to
afford adequate housing, education, or training. The cycle is vicious
and self-perpetuating.
The efforts directed toward the elimination of discrimination in
employment have produced a variety of forums and alternative bases
for obtaining relief. It is hoped that a comparative evaluation of the
advantages and disadvantages of these forums and bases will give
lawyers a better understanding of the opportunities and methods available to combat racial discrimination in employment.
At one time the general practitioner appropriately considered efforts
devoted to combatting discrimination to be in the nature of uncompensated public service. Today, however, such a view is mistaken. Statutory
provisions for attorneys' fees have eliminated much of the practical
concern arising from the typical client's impecunious condition.2 Since
it is the fee generating capacity of tax practice, estate planning, corporate practice, and personal injury litigation that has produced the
high level of professional performance in those areas of the law, statutes enacted to prevent racial discrimination should not go without
development and refinement because of professional ignorance that they
also have a fee generating capacity. 3
Among the factors to be considered in a comparative evaluation of
forums and bases for obtaining relief from racial discrimination in
employment are the following: (1) the parties proceeded against-employers, employer associations, employment agencies, or unions; (2)
the status of the complainant-whether employed or a union member;
(3) the possibility that a collective bargaining agreement may affect
the employment involved; (4) the limitation periods within which
proceedings must be initiated; (5) the effect of proceeding in one forum
upon remedies which might be available in other forums; (6) the type
of relief available in the forum; (7) the provisions for payment of
attorneys' fees or for obtaining attorneys' services; (8) the investiga2. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text, infra.
3. Although a case involving economic disability produced by racial discrimination
against a single individual may not have a fee generating capacity comparable to that of
a case involving disability produced by personal injuries, the class action potential of
cases involving racial discrimination provides a broader basis of support than most
personal injury cases. See notes 50-56 and accompanying text, infra.
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tory and discovery procedures which are available; and (9) special
defenses applicable to particular proceedings.
I.

TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 contains some of the
most important provisions yet enacted for remedying racial discrimination in employment, but, as this article will show, it is not always to be
preferred over other bases of relief. Indeed there are distinct advantages
available by proceeding on other bases, which should not be overlooked
amidst the growing case law and literature5 concerning Title VII. At
times it will appear that the best course is to pursue the various avenues
of relief concurrently.
The Act contains comprehensive prohibitions against discrimination in employment practiced by employers, employment agencies, labor
organizations, or joint labor-management training programs. Since
July 2, 1968, it has applied to employers engaged in an industry affecting commerce who have twenty-five or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calandar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year.6 It also applies to employment agencies procuring employees for such an employer and to almost all labor organizations. 7
An Equal Employment Opportunities Commission [hereinafter
referred to as E.E.O.C.] established by the Act is charged with certain
responsibilities for its administration. However, the powers of the

4. 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e-2000e-1 (1964).

S. A useful symposium devoted to Title VII appears in 7 B.C. Inn. & Com. L. Rxv.
413-652 (1966). Other valuable comments upon the Act appear in Blumrosen, Seniority
and Equal Employment Opportunity: A Glimmer of Hope, 23 RUTGERs L. Rav. 268
(1969); Cooper and Sobol, Seniority and Testing under Fair Employment Laws: A
General Approach to Objective Criteriaof Hiring and Promotion, 82 HRV. L. Rav. 1598
(1969); Blumrosen, The Newport News Agreement-One Brief Shining Moment in the
Enforcement of Equal Employment Opportunity, 1968 U. Iz. L.F. 269; Blumrosen,

The Duty of FairRecruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22 RuTnaas L. Rar.
465 (1968); Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1 (1967); Sherman, Union's Duty of Fair
Representation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 Mnm. L. REv. 771 (1965); Comment, The Scope of Judicial Relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46
TmXAS L. REv. 516 (1968); Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination,and the Incumbent
Negro, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1260 (1967); Comment, Enforcement of Fair Employment

under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 32 U. CE r . L. Rav. 430 (1965).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964).

7. 42 US.C. § 2000e(c), (e), -2(b), -2(c), (1964).
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E.E.O.C. are limited to investigation, mediation, and conciliation.'
Nothing said or done in the course of an attempt to obtain compliance
may be made public without the consent of the parties, nor may it
subsequently be used as evidence in a court proceeding. The E.E.O.C.
is not authorized to issue cease and desist orders or to direct any other
remedial action, nor may it initiate law suits to obtain compliance with
the Act. It may, however, make recommendations to the Attorney
General that he initiate a suit based upon a pattern or practice of
discrimination pursued by a person or group of persons or that he
intervene in a suit initiated by an aggrieved personf A grudging grant
of access to the courts is found in the provision which permits the
E.E.O.C. to commence proceedings to compel a respondent to comply
with an order of a court issued in a civil action initially brought by an
aggrieved person.' 0
These limited enforcement powers have given the E.E.O.C. a role
much less significant with respect to preventing violations of Title VII
than, for example, that of the National Labor Relations Board with
respect to the National Labor Relations Act. Proposals which are
currently being considered would broaden the role of the E.E.O.C. by
authorizing it to determine whether violations of the Act have occurred
and to issue cease and desist orders." Until its powers are enlarged, its
role will be limited primarily to that of mediator and conciliator-a
role which may produce such delays as to make other bases for obtaining relief more attractive.
A written charge of a violation of the Act must be filed with the
E.E.O.C. within 90 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred, unless the person aggrieved has commenced a proceeding
before a state or local authority authorized to grant relief from such a
practicej 2 In the latter case, a written charge must be filed within 210
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or within
30 days after the person aggrieved has received notice that the state or
local agency has terminated the proceeding, whichever is earlier.:' The
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f), -5, -8, -9 (1964).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f) (6) (1964).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(i) (1964).
11. See E.E.O.C. Enforcement Bill Moves Forward,74 LAB. xL. RFP. 305 (1970).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(d) (1964). For a discussion of state anti-discrimination
agencies, see notes 169-187 and accompanying text, infra.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-5(d) (1964).
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filing of a charge with the E.E.O.C. is a jurisdictional condition precedent to the bringing of a private civil action under Title VII. 4 The
only parties properly made defendants in a Title VII. action are those
who have previously been named respondents in an administrative
charge filed with E.E.O.C.' 5 But courts have not otherwise dealt with
Title VII requirements in a technical way. An unsworn charge has been
held sufficient, for example, despite what the court concluded was a
directory provision of the statute for a charge under oath.'8 An important decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that an
aggrieved person's error in attaching the wrong legal conclusion to the
allegations of the charge was a defect which could be cured by amendment at any time.' 7 It is sufficient if the allegations of the complaint
are reasonably related to the charge filed with the E.E.O.C.18 Also, as
will be discussed later, the developing rule seems to be that one who
has filed a charge may thereafter maintain a class action for the benefit
of those similarly affected even though they have not filed charges with
the E.E.O.C.' 9
Delays in the processing of the charges filed with the E.E.O.C.
might have become a substantial barrier to enforcement of the provisions of the Act, but administrative practices and court decisions have
done much to obviate that concern. The statute established a 30 day
period (which, pursuant to the statute, the E.E.O.C. has extended to
60 days) 0 to obtain voluntary compliance. The E.E.O.C. must then
notify the aggrieved person that it has been unable to obtain compliance
with the Act. The person aggrieved then has 30 days within which to
commence suit in a United States District Court. 21 In fact, however,
the E.E.O.C. was not able to give the contemplated notices in timely

14. Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970); Dent v. St.
Louis-S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402
F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.
1968); Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1967); McClendon
v. North Am. Rockwell Corp. 2 F.EP. Cases 593 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 1970).
15. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
16. Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968).
17. Sanchez v. Standard Brands, 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970).
18. Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Me. 1970); Roberson v.
Great Am. Ins. Cos., 71 L.R.RM. 2706 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Burney v. North Am. Rockwell
Corp., 302 F. Supp. 86 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
19. See notes 35 to 45 and accompanying text, infra.
20. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25a(a) (1970).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964).
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fashion because of the caseload imposed on an inadequate staff. This
administrative breakdown threatened either that genuine attempts at
conciliation would be held jurisdictional requisites to individual civil
actions, or that the maximum 90 days period contemplated by the
statute between the filing of a charge and the filing of suit would be
given controlling effect, cutting off the possibility of suit even though
the E.E.O.C. had not in fact attempted to obtain voluntary compliance.
The E.E.O.C. responded to this problem by making provision in its
procedural rules that after the expiration of 60 days following the filing
of a charge, an aggrieved person may demand that a notice issue that
the E.E.O.C. has not been able to obtain voluntary compliance with the
22

Act.

While some district courts have concluded that an actual attempt
at conciliation by the E.E.O.C. was a jurisdictional requisite to a private civil action,28 the courts of appeal have avoided such a defeatist
reading of the statute and have held that a private civil suit may be
maintained after the E.E.O.C. has been given an opportunity to conciliate for the stated period of time.2 4 The latter view represents a better
accommodation to the realities of the administrative process, and seems
likely to prevail. It likewise appears that the courts will permit private
civil actions to be brought more than 180 days after the alleged discriminatory action so long as they are commenced within 30 days after
receipt of notice that the E.E.O.C. has not been able to obtain compliance with the Act. 5
The fact that the E.E.O.C. does investigate the charge and concludes
that there is no reasonable cause to believe that a violation of Title VII
has occurred does not bar a private civil action.2 6 The view is that the
E.E.O.C.'s role is that of investigator and conciliator, but not of final
arbitrator of the rights created by the Act.
The provisions of the statute applicable to unlawful practices occur-

22. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25a(b) (1970).
23. Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps, 71 L.R.RM. 3158 (CD. Cal. 1969); Dent v. St.
Louis-S.F. Ry. 265 F Supp. 56 (N.D. Ala. 1967), rev'd, 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969).
24. Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969); Dent v. St. Louis-S.F.
Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645
(4th Cir. 1968); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968).
25. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969).
26. Flowers v. Local 6, Laborers, 431 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1970); Fekete v. United
States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 540 (3rd Cir. 1970); Grimm v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
300 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
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ring in a state which has a state or local law prohibiting such practice7
2
have been a source of difficulty for litigants, particularly in California.
Title VII provides that no charge shall be filed with the E.E.O.C. until
60 days after proceedings have been commenced under state or local
law, unless the state or local proceeding is sooner terminated. 8 After
the elapse of the 60 day period the filing of a charge with E.E.O.C. will
be timely if it is done within 210 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred or within 30 days after the aggrieved person has received
notice that the state or local authority has terminated its proceeding.2 9
The complications in timing the filing of charges are great for an aggrieved person who believes that he has been the victim of various
forms of discrimination, only some of which the state or local authority
may remedy, or for which the state authority may only be empowered
to assess penalties but not order affirmative relief. This is particularly
the case if the failure to file a prior charge with the state or local authority is deemed to deprive the E.E.O.C. of authority to accept a charge
and, subsequently, to deny a court jurisdiction to entertain a private
suit. 0 The E.E.O.C. has attempted to eliminate the problem by a
procedural rule which provides for automatic referral of charges filed
to those state or local agencies which are empowered to act pursuant
to a state or local anti-discrimination law.31 The same rule provides
for a constructive filing with the E.E.O.C. of the charges after the
expiration of a 60 day deferral period. The procedure thus established
would seem to fulfill the purposes of the statutory provisions involved,
and it has obtained court approval in one case in which it perhaps was
not necessary because the aggrieved person had requested the E.E.O.C.
in writing to assume jurisdiction of the case after the expiration of the
82
deferral period.
A comparable problem exists with respect to the relationship between

27. See McClendon v. North Am. Rockwell, 2 F.E.P. Cases 593 (CD. Cal. Apr. 27,
1970); Warehousemens Local 17 v. Quinn, 2 F.E.P. Cases 77 (ED. Cal. 1969); Jefferson
v. Peerless Pumps, 71 L.R.R.M. 3158 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Watts v. Douglas Aircraft Co.,
70 L.R.R.M. 2907 (CD. Cal. 1968); Edwards v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 291 F.
Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1968)
28. 42 U.S.C. § 200ae-5(b) (1964).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(d) (1964).
30. Cf. Crosslin v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 422 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1970);
Edwards v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1970).
32. Nlshiyama v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 49 F.RD. 288 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
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proceedings under the statute and proceedings under the grievance and
arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that the statutory limitation
periods are tolled when an employee first pursues his contractual remedies.8" The court, no doubt being affected by its view that courts have a
duty to make the Act work, noted that this conclusion is consistent
with the statute's emphasis upon private methods of settlement. 4
The answer to the question of whether class actions may be maintained on behalf of persons who have not filed a charge with the
E.E.O.C. and obtained notice that it could not obtain compliance is of
importance for accomplishing the purposes of the Act because a suit
for the benefit of only one person will make only a slight contribution
toward obtaining employment equality. The E.E.O.C. has no staff of
attorneys to represent aggrieved persons in suits brought under the
Act, and the pattern or practice suits which may be instituted by the
Attorney General have not been instituted with as much frequency as
private actions.3 5 Class actions may become a means by which a broader
public interest may be asserted in those private suits and a vehicle by
which impecunious victims of discrimination are in fact able to afford
and thus obtain representation by counsel.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes provision
for class actions in the following terms: s"
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
33. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
34. Id. at 891.
35. Professor St. Antoine informed the Labor Section of the American Bar Association
at its 1969 annual meeting that sixty or so suits had been filed by private parties and
about forty suits had been filed by the Attorney General. Address by Professor St.
Antoine, ABA Labor Law Section Convention, Aug. 11, 1969, in ABA SEcTioN OF LABOR
RELATiONS LAW, REPORT OF 1969 PROCEEDINGS 171, 172 (1970).

36.
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Additional requirements for the maintenance of a class action are im37
posed, including the following important requirement:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained
as a class action if ...
(3) the court finds that the questiohs of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability
or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.
Of prime importance is the question of whether the filing of charges
with the E.E.O.C. is an essential criterion for determining who may
constitute members of a class. Some of the district courts which first
considered the question answered in the affirmative,88 but the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has reached a contrary conclusion in a
series of more authoritative and persuasive decisions.3 9 The court
reasoned that it would be wasteful for all employees with the same grievance to have to process their identical complaints with the E.E.O.C. If
it were impossible to mediate a settlement for one victim of discrimination with a particular grievance, there is little reason to assume that the
E.E.O.C. would be successful with another complaint raising the same
issue. 0 A suit under Title VII should be viewed as more than a private
claim for particular relief. It is an action with heavy overtones of public
37. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b).
38. Miller v. International Paper Co., 290 F. Supp. 401 (SD. Miss. 1967); Allen v.
Lockheed-Georgia Co., 2 F.E.P. Cases 20 (ND. Ga. 1968); Cf. Williams v. American
Saint Gobain Corp., 70 L.R.R.M. 2325 (EJD. Okla. 1968).
39. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Circ. 1969); Miller
v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp.,

400 F.2d "(Sth Cir. 1968); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.
1968); See also Arrington v. Mass Bay Transp. Authority, 306 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass.
1969); Railway Employees v. Ilinois Cent. R.R., 2 F.E.P. Cases 184 (N-D. Il. 1969).
40. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1968).
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interest in effectuating the policies of the Act, rendering a class approach particularly appropriate. 4 1 Accordingly, one who has standing to
raise a particular issue with the E.E.O.C. should be permitted to maintain the action for himself and a class of persons similarly situated.
There are, of course, substantial difficulties in determining what
constitutes a class of persons similarly situated. Racial discrimination
may be practiced in many forms and have a variety of effects upon
persons. A person hired to work on a transportation company's loading
dock may be a victim of racial discrimination when he is denied a
promotion to truck driver, but does this qualify him to represent a
class of all victims of his employer's discrimination, including clerical
and administrative employees working in offices in other cities? 42 Does
a person denied a promotion in one department share a class interest
with persons denied promotions in other departments or persons denied
the opportunity to take training courses? 43 May a person currently
employed represent a class including job applicants or persons previously discharged or laid-off?
The answers to these questions should not be formulated as general
rules of law applied prior to trial. Instead, as the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit has suggested, the significance of individual fact patterns with respect to the propriety of a class action to remedy a particular employer's practices may be ascertainable only after all the
evidence, or a substantial part of it, has been heard; and, if the notices
contemplated by Rule 23 (c) generate a number of interventions, groupings based on interests and fact patterns may be served by establishing
sub-classes. 4 Under Federal Rule 23 a court "has the duty, and ample
powers, both in the conduct of the trial and in the relief granted to treat
45
common things in common and to distinguish the distinguishable."
As mentioned above, the availability of legal representation for
aggrieved persons is of great importance in bringing about enforcement
of the Act. The statute does contain a provision for appointment of
an attorney upon application by an aggrieved person to the court as
41. Id. at 499.
42. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
43. See Smith v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Okla. 1970).
44. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). See
also Wilson v. Monstanto Co., 2 F.E.P. Cases 370 (E.D. La. Jan. 7, 1970).
45. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 35 (5th Cir. 1968).
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well as authorization to proceed without payment of fees, costs, or
security.4 6 Developing case law appears to be establishing the principle
that an aggrieved person need not be a pauper in order to have an
attorney appointed to represent him.4 But courts show an inclination
to scrutinize an applicant's financial condition and make a preliminary
appraisal of the merits of a claim before making an appointment. 48
Appointed attorneys serve without guarantee of compensation, other
than that which the courts impose upon plaintiffs as a condition of
appointment, but the statute does contain provision for awarding an
attorney's fee to the prevailing party.4 9
Traditionally the amount of an attorney's fee is determined after
consideration of a number of factors, including the amount recovered,
the time fairly required to be spent on the case, the skill required and
employed, the intricacy, novelty and complexity of the issues, the difficulty of determining the facts and developing evidence, the skill and
resourcefulness of opposing counsel, prevailing rates of compensation,
the contingent nature of the fee, and the benefit derived by the public
from the action. 0 Concluding that Congress intended the compensation
awarded as attorneys' fees under the statute to be reasonable by
traditional standards, one court awarded a fee of $20,000.00 in a
case to which plaintiffs' attorneys devoted over 580 hours-a fee somewhat in excess of that payable pursuant to the state's suggested minimum bar fee.51 The only relief obtained for the two individual plaintiffs
was reinstatement in employment without loss of seniority, but without
compensation for lost pay.52 It would seem that the most valuable part
of the work of the attorneys was in the class relief obtained in the suit.
In addition, noting that the statute directs the payment of the attorney's
fee to the litigant and not to his lawyer, the court indicated that an
attorney might through his contract of employment be entitled to a fee

46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(e) (1964).
47. Edmonds v. E. I. DuPont, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 523 (D. Kan. 1970); Petite v.
Consolidated Freightways, 313 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D. Texas 1970).
48. Puffer v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 308 F. Supp. 443 (D. Kan. 1969); Aiken v. New
York Times, 2 F.E.P. Cases 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Green v. Cotton Concentration Co.,
294 F. Supp. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(k) (1964).
50. See Green v. Transitron Electronic Corp. 326 F.2d 492, 496 (1st Cir. 1964).
Annot. 56 AL.R.2d 13 (1957).
51. Clark v. American Marine Corp., 2 F.E.P. Cases 670 (E.D. La. 1970).
52. See Clark v. American Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1969).
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in excess of that allowed by the court. Or, as seemed possible in the
case, the amount awarded might exceed that which the plaintiff had
obligated himself to pay to his attorney. Another court awarded the
individual plaintiff damages of $4,400.00 and approved an attorney's
fee in the larger amount of $5,000.00, which similarly suggests that
the relief granted in the class action was a substantial consideration
in determining what was the appropriate fee." Another court approved
an attorney's fee of $1000.00 even though the individual plaintiff did
not prevail upon his claim for reinstatement, because he did succeed
in proving that he and the class of other Negroes employed were the
victims of a discriminatory dual classification system. 4 Other courts
have not been so liberal in the allowance of attorneys' fees,55 but the
Supreme Court has clearly indicated that courts should not take a
restrictive view of their powers under the Act in awarding attorneys'
fees. In a suit brought under Title II of the Act to enjoin discrimination
the Court said:"8
A Title II suit is thus private in form only. When a plaintiff brings
an action under that Title, he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not only for himself alone but also
as a ((private attorney general" vindicating a policy that Congress
considered of the highest priority. If successful plaintiffs were
routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved
parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by
invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts. Congress
therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees-not simply to
penalize litigants who deliberately advance arguments they know
to be untenable but, more broadly, to encourage individuals injured
by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title II.
While plaintiffs in suits under Title VII may recover damages, and
plaintiffs seeking to eliminate discrimination in places of public accommodation under Title II may not, the public interest in eliminating
racial discrimination in employment is certainly of such magnitude as

53.

Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970).

54.

Gunn v. Layne & Bowler, 69 I.R.R.M. 2237 (W.D. Tenn. 1967). See Also Parham

v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 4343 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
55. Robinson v. P. Lorillard Co., 2 F.E.P. Cases 465 (M.D.N.C.

Mar. 12, 1970);
Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969).
56. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
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to merit an award of attorney fees as an encouragement to seek judicial
relief.
Specific provision is made in the Act to preclude application of the
doctrine of federal preemption to state or local laws designed to prevent
discrimination, 57 thereby making possible parallel remedies under federal and state law. A similar synchronization of Title VII and the
grievance and arbitration procedures commonly found in collective
bargaining agreements has been threatened, however, by developing
case law. The important role assigned to arbitration in our national
labor policy" has led some courts to hold that a person who has pursued
a grievance charging discrimination through to final and binding arbitration has thereby made an election of remedies which precludes the
presdntation of that same complaint in a suit under the Act., 9 The
reasoning is that consideration of the complaint after an adverse decision in the arbitration procedure would undermine the process and
erode the authority of arbitrators. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, which has played a significant role in developing the Act as
effective legislation against discrimination, has reached a contrary conclusion holding that pursuit of the grievance and arbitration procedures
under a collective bargaining agreement does not constitute an election
of remedies barring resort to suit under the Act 0 Indeed, that court
had earlier produced a synchronization of arbitration proceedings and
suits under the Act with its holding that invocation of grievance and
arbitration procedures available under a collective bargaining agreement tolled the limitation period for the filing of charges with the
E.E.O.C.8 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has reached
the conclusion that utilization of available grievance and arbitration
procedures should not bar suit under the Act 8 2 The reasoning of these
cases is that, while Title VII's encouragement of private methods of
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1964).
58. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 239 (1970); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 US. 593 (1960).
59. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, rehearing denied, 2 F.E.P. Cases
869 (6th Cir. 1970); Newman v. Avco Corp., 313 F. Supp. 1069 (M.D. Tenn. 1970);
Edwards v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 191 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Washington
v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 282 F. Supp 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
60. Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1970).
61. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
62. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cr. 1969).
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settlement should be recognized, an arbitrator may act only to vindicate
the contract rights of an individual, and this should not result in
sacrifice of the tremendous public interest in obtaining compliance
with the Act. It is too early to predict with confidence that this latter
view will prevail, but it has much to commend it.'
Of significance in evaluating the desirability of suit under Title VII
is the fact that the statute establishes specific limitations upon a court's
power to order changes in employment practices based upon seniority
or the use of professionally developed ability tests. The exact language
of the limitation provides that it is not an unlawful employment practice:0 4
for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant
to a bona fide seniority or merit system .

.

. provided that such

differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate . . .
nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed
ability test provided that such test, its administration or action
upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate ....
The provision relating to bona fide merit systems is of importance
even in those cases where, before the Act became effective, an employer
or labor organization abandoned any practice the object of which was
to discriminate. The continued use of seniority acquired during a time
when discrimination was purposefully practiced may perpetuate that
discrimination. For example, if prior to the effective date of the Act,
Negroes were not employed in certain departments or in certain job
lines of progression, use of departmental or job line seniority for the
purpose of either lay-off or promotion will adversely affect Negroes.
This is so because the determinations are made upon the basis of work
experience which white employees had been able to acquire but which
Negroes had not. 5 An uncritical reading of the statutory limitation
63. For elaborate treatment of the relationship between Title VII and arbitration
under procedures established by a collective bargaining agreement, see Gould, Labor
Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. Pa. L. REv. 40 (1969) ;
Platt, The Relationship Between Arbitration and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 3 GA. L. REV. 398 (1969).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
65. For excellent, detailed analyses of the problem, see Blumrosen, Seniority and
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preserving bona fide seniority systems would substantially delay the
time when Negroes or other racial minorities could enjoy full job equality with whites.
For the most part courts have avoided giving such a disabling effect
to the statutory provision. In the leading case of Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc.,6 6 the court concluded that the employer had not engaged
in discriminatory employment practices after January 1, 1966. Prior to
that time, however, the employer had engaged in discriminatory practices which resulted in the substantial exclusion of Negroes from work
in the fabrication and warehouse departments of the plant. The employer followed a system under which departmental seniority rather
than total length of service with the employer was a significant factor
in determining who would receive advancements to higher paying
positions in the fabrication and warehouse departments. The consequence was that those Negroes who were hired before January 1, 1966,
were at a competitive disadvantage in bidding for the higher paying
positions in the fabrication and warehouse departments. A Negro who
chose to transfer to the fabrication or warehouse department after
January 1, 1966, had seniority only from the date of his transfer, and
hence was disfavored in comparison with a white employee who had
worked no longer for the employer but who when hired was able to go
to work in the fabrication department. The Court undertook to remedy
the situation by substituting plant or employment seniority for departmental seniority for those qualified Negroes who desired to transfer to
either the fabrication or warehouse departments. It did so despite the
argument of both the employer and the union that the departmental
seniority system, neutral on its face, was protected by the language
quoted above. As the court saw it, the provision saving bona fide
seniority systems did not validate those seniority systems which currently cause variant treatment because of discrimination practiced in
the past.
Other courts have since reached similar conclusions and ordered
departure from departmental or job line seniority and substitution of
Equal Employment Opportunity, 23 RuTroms L. REv. 268 (1969); Gould, Employment,
Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13
How. L.J. 1 (1967); Note, Title Vii, Seniority, Discrimination and the Incumbent
Negro, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1260 (1967).
66. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E-D. Va. 1968).
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plant or other seniority systems where necessary to prevent past discrimination from being perpetuated0 7 Some courts have reached a
contrary conclusion,68 but it seems safe to predict that the Quarles
interpretation will ultimately prevail. The consequence is that the bona
fide seniority limitation will not preclude the remedying of present
employment disadvantages produced by a seniority system, if that
system reflects discrimination practiced at the time an aggrieved
person was employed by that employer.
A comparable problem has arisen with respect to referral practices
of labor unions, typically in the exclusive union hiring hall procedures
used in the building trades. If length of service under a collective
bargaining agreement is used as a criterion for determining the order
of referral, racial discrimination previously practiced in referrals but
now abandoned will nevertheless be given effect. This is so because
the order of referral will depend upon qualifications which members
of the racial minorities could not acquire at a time when white persons
could. Courts have shown an awareness of this possibility of perpetuating the effects of previous discrimination and have ordered unions to
alter referral practices in a manner designed to avoid such a result.69
For those members of racial minorities who were first employed after
their particular employer abandoned discriminatory policies, use of
seniority for determining the order of lay-off has the effect of producing
lay-offs of a larger proportion of the persons formerly discriminated
against than of other employees. There are no cases considering whether
such variant treatment violates the Act. A conclusion that such a use of
seniority does not violate the Act rests in part upon the assumption
that the employee group with which the racial minority members should
67. Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp., 429 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1970); Irwin v. Mohawk
Rubber Co., 308 F. Supp. 152 (E. D. Ark. 1970); Long v. Georgia Kraft Co., 2 F.E.P.
Cases 658 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 1970); Robinson v. P. Lorillard Co., 2 F.E.P. Cases 465
(M.D.N.C. Mar. 12, 1970); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp, 312 F. Supp. 977,
(W.D.N.Y. 1970); Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 69 L.R.R.M. 2005 (E.D. La. 1968);
Cf. Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir.), Cert. granted, 399 U.S. 926 (1970); Broussard v. Schlumberger Corp., 315 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
68. See, e.g., Williams v. American Saint Gobain Corp., 2 F.E.P. Cases 331 (Ef..
Okla. 1969); United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (NJ). Ala. 1968).
69. United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969);
Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
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be compared consists of those who were first employed after the discriminatory policies were abandoned rather than with all employees.
If that group is accepted for the purposes of comparison, there is no
discrimination. The problems of proving that the prior discriminatory
policies disadvantage one hired after abandonment of those policies,
i.e., proving that one would have been hired sooner, are much greater
than those of proving disadvantage to one who was in fact hired while
discrimination was being practiced. In any event it appears that Congress intended that the effect of the bona fide seniority system limitation would preserve seniority of employees in a previously all white
70
plant.
The limitation with respect to professionally developed ability tests
has also produced litigation.7' The greatest source of difficulty seems
to be with respect to whether a test professionally developed and not
designed or used to discriminate may be used if it does not have a
proven job-related validity. If, as has been suggested, 72 some standardized tests have a built-in cultural bias in favor of whites which
results in inaccurate predictions of job performance, continued use of
those tests with knowledge of these imperfections constitutes an intended discrimination in the familiar legal sense that one intends those
consequences which he knows or believes are virtually certain to follow

70. An authoritative memorandum prepared by Senators Clark and Case states:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Effect is prospective
and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business had been discriminating in the
past and as a result has an all-white working force, when the title comes into effect
the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a non-discriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or indeed permitted-to fire whites in
order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or once Negroes
are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers
hired earlier.
110 CoNG. RFc. 7213 (1964).

For a detailed analysis of the legislative history and a suggestion that the bona fide
seniority limitation should not protect the seniority system of a previously all-white plant,
see Cooper and Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1598, 1607-29

(1969).
71. See notes 73-77 and accompanying text, infra. It has also produced helpful comments upon the problem. See Cooper and Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion,
82 H1ARv. L. REV. 1598, 1637-76 (1969); Kovarsky, Some Social and Legal Aspects of

Testing Under the Civil Rights Act, 20 LAB. L.J. 346 (1969); Ruch & Ash, Comments
on Psychological Testing, 69 CoLum. L. REv. 608 (1969); Note, Legal Implications of

the Use of StandardizedAbility Tests in Employment and Education, 68 CoLuM. L. Rev.
691 (1968).
72. See authorities cited in note 71, supra.
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from what he does. If the tests do not provide a valid prediction of
employment performance, the economic justification for an employer's
use of them disappears and the case for characterizing that use as
intentional discrimination becomes even stronger.
The Supreme Court has resolved many of the problems with its
recent holding in Griggs v. Duke Power Company." The Court held
that the Act prohibited an employer from requiring either a high school
education or the passing of a standardized general intelligence test as a
condition for employment in or transfer to a job where there was no
proof that either requirement bore any significant relationship to job
performance and both operated to disqualify a disproportionate number
of Negroes. Proof of a discriminatory motive was not required to establish a violation because, "... good intent or absence of discriminatory
intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms
that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability."7 4 Thus, if the result of a test is
to disqualify proportionately more members of a racial minority than
whites, its use is prohibited absent a demonstration that it is a reasonable measure of job performance."' Presumably the holding will extend
to other job qualifications which have an effect of disfavoring members
of racial minorities. It was on this basis that one district court invalidated a rule barring from employment persons with a substantial record
78
of arrests without conviction.
The cases involving seniority and testing present only facets of the
problem of whether an intent to discriminate must be established to
obtain relief under the Act. The language of the Act with respect to
employers is: 77
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
73. - U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971).
74. - U.S. at -, 91 S. Ct. at 854.
75. - U.S. at -, 91 S. Ct. at 856.
76. Gregory v. Litton Systems, 316 F. Supp. 401 (C. D. Cal. 1970). The case is
especially notable because the finding of discrimination rested upon a finding that Negroes
are arrested substantially more frequently than whites. Thus the consequence of using a
test of arrests without convictions is to bar proportionately more Negroes than whites
from employment.
77. 42. U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964).
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because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ....
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
Comparable language is used with respect to unlawful employment
practices of labor unions.78 As a careful reading discloses, the prohibited
failure or refusals are not expressly required to be intentional, and
indeed the prohibitions extend to practices which only "tend to deprive"
an individual of employment opportunities. Even the word "discriminate" in the prohibitions could be given a meaning applicable to
variant treatments accorded individuals by employers, even though it
might not have been the purpose or object of the practice to produce
racially variant treatment. Unlawful employment practices may thus
include such practices as hiring on recommendation of current employees or by word of mouth advertising.
It is the remedial section of the Act that imposes a requirement of
proving an intent. The authorization for issuing an injunction or ordering other relief is made dependent upon the court finding that" "the
respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in
an unlawful employment practice ... ." The problem is the old and
familiar one of whether consequences are intentional when it is known
that they are virtually certain to result from conduct or whether they
must be the purpose or object of the conduct.8 " Most of the cases which
have arisen thus far involve discrimination purposefully practiced,
either currently or in the past, and hence they have not provided a test
of the ultimate reach of the statutory language. A few recent cases
indicate that the known consequence test will be applied. In one case
the policy of "hiring at the gate," which resulted in almost entirely
white employment, was found to be a violation of the Act 1 In another
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1964).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964).
80. For an analysis of the legislative history leading to the conclusion that Title VII

does not require a specific intention to discriminate, see Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and
Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of
Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1598, 1673-76 (1969).
81.

Clark v. American Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp. 603 (ED. La. 1969).
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case reliance upon current employees to refer new applicants was held
to violate the Act because it produced few if any Negro applicants. 2
Full commitment to eradicating racial discrimination in employment
requires the adoption of the test of known consequences for the purpose of determining whether an employer has intentionally engaged in
an unlawful employment practice. That commitment appears to have
been given in the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power
Company,83 adopting the test of known consequences rather than subjective motivation with respect to the validity of testing and educational
requirements. The possibility that a business interest might be found
sufficient to justify a known discriminatory effect is suggested by the
Court's reservation of the question of whether testing requirements
which did not measure ability to perform the job under consideration
could be validated by showing that they had relevance for succeeding
4
positions to which employees might be promoted.1
If the court finds that a respondent has intentionally engaged in an
unlawful employment practice the remedies available include an injunction against continuation of the practice and appropriate affirmative
relief, such as reinstatement of employees with back pay.85 As the
cases involving seniority systems indicate, courts have exercised a
considerable amount of ingenuity in fashioning relief appropriate in
specific circumstances.
While the E.E.O.C. is not authorized to seek initial judicial relief,
it does have the power to refer cases to the Attorney General for intervention in an action brought by an individual or for institution of a
pattern or practice suit.86 The Attorney General is authorized to bring
suit when he has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group
of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to full
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the Act.8 In suits brought by
the Attorney General the relief requested may include an injunction
against the person responsible for a pattern or practice of discrimination.88 The traditional breadth of prosecutorial discretion with regard

82.
83.
84.
85.

Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
- U.S. -, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971).
Id. at 854.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964).

86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1964).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f) (6) (1964).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1964).
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to institution of suits will undoubtedly be enjoyed by the Attorney
General, with the result that there is little a private party can do beyond
attempting to persuade him to file a pattern or practice suit.
The equitable nature of the relief authorized under the statute has
led to the conclusion that, at least in the private action, the defendant
does not have a right to jury trial."9 This is so even though the requested
relief includes a claim for money damages. Money damages are considered incidental to the basic demand for equitable relief. The practical significance of absence of a right to jury trial is, of course,
enormous, and will remain so for as long as a substantial part of the
population practices discrimination or adheres to racist views.
II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
In its 1968 decision in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Company, the Supreme Court resuscitated the Civil Rights Act of 1866 with a holding
that its prohibitions applied to racial discrimination by private persons
in the sale of propertY 90 It did so over protests that enactment of the
fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has rendered the
question of the scope of the 1866 Act a matter of such limited importance as not to be worthy of review.9 The section of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act upon which the holding rested states quite simply: 92
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property.
Another section of the post Civil War Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, currently provides: 9 3
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
89. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969); Gillim v.
Federal Paper Board Co., 2 F.E.P. Cases 837 (D. Conn. July 13, 1970); Moss v. Lane
Co., So F.R-D. 122 (WD. Va. 1970); Carter v. HoIt W'lliamson Mfg. Co., 2 F.E.P.
Cases 678 (E.D.N.C 1969).
90. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
91. Id. at 477-79.
92. 42 U.S.C. 1982 (1964).
93. For a discussion of the legislative antecedents of the current provision, see Waters
v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1970).
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contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pain, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other.
It is the guarantee of the right to contract that has led a number of
courts to conclude by analogy to Jones that racial discrimination in
employment by private persons is also forbidden by the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.11 The holdings have not been unanimous,95 but the conclusion that such discrimination can be redressed in a suit under the
Act follows logically from the Jones analysis. Textually, the language
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is as supportive of this conclusion as was the
statutory language relied upon in Jones. The relationship between
achieving equality in employment in fact bears a stronger relationship
to effective abolition of the badges of slavery than achieving equality in
sale of housing. Arguments that the simple and unelaborated provisions
of the 1866 Act should not be given a vitality which renders the 1964
Act superfluous have no greater weight with regard to racial discrimination in employment than they have with regard to racial discrimination
in the sale of housing. Nor should there be any greater concern with
regard to whether state action must be involved in racial discrimination
in employment than in racial discrimination in the sale of housing.
Whether the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger will follow the
course set by the Court under Chief Justice Warren presents the only
serious question as to the availability of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for redress
of discrimination in employment.
Among the significant differences between suits under the 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is that an aggrieved
party under the former may be able to proceed directly to suit without the delay involved in processing a charge through the E.E.O.C.

94. Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970); Washington v. Baugh Constr. Co.,
313 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Wash. 1969); Clark v. American Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp.
603 (E.D. La. 1969); Dobbins v. Local 212, I.B.E.W., 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio
1968).
95. Evans v. Local 2127, I.B.E.W., 313 F. Supp. 1354 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Smith v.
North Am. Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515 (NJ:. Okla. 1970); Harrison v. American Can
Co., 2 F.E.P. Cases 1 (S.D. Ala. 1969); Waters v. Puschen Contractors Inc., 227 F. Supp.
659 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,* however, has not permitted such a by-passing of the E.E.O.C. unless the person suing under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 establishes a reasonable excuse for failure to exhaust
his E.E.O.C. remedies.9 6 Undoubtedly of even greater importance in
some cases is the fact that no specific limitation period is stated for
suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which means that the governing
limitation period is probably that provided by an appropriate state
statute of limitations . 7 Suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 may thus be
available in many cases which would be time-barred by the short
limitation periods established in Title VII. Suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
may be particularly advantageous as compared to suit under Title VII
if an attack is to be made upon the discriminatory effects produced
by a seniority system or testing because it avoids the special defense
provided in Title VII for variant treatment pursuant to bona fide
seniority systems and professionally developed ability tests not intended to be discriminatory. The importance of this last difference
between the statutes depends, of course, upon what construction is
finally attached to the pertinent provisions of Title VII. That there is
no provision for awarding attorneys' fees in suits under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 may be of significance in cases involving only individual
discrimination, but this deficiency may be of diminished importance
if the suit brought is a class action involving substantial financial
recoveries.
The decision of the Supreme Court last term in Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 8 requires special consideration for its impact on
suits brought to remedy racial discrimination in employment. In that
case plaintiffs, a white owner of a house and a Negro to whom the house
was rented, brought suit seeking both damages -and equitable relief
* [After the manuscript for this article had been submitted to the printer, the Court
of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit reached the conclusion that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
did not by implication repeal the Civil Rights Act of 1866. It further concluded that
exhaustion of the conciliation procedures of the 1964 Act was not a jurisdictional requisite
for suit under the 1866 statute, but was instead only a fact to be considered in the exercise of discretion concerning the appropriate relief for a violation. Young v. International
Telephone and Telegraph Co., - F2d -, 3 F.E.P. Cases 196 (3rd Cir. 1971).]
96. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970).
97. Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970); Dobbins v. Local 212, I.B.E.W.,. 292
F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968); Cf. U.A.W. v., Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696
(1966).
98. 396 US. 229 (1969).
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following the refusal of the board of an incorporated community park
and playground to permit transfer of the white owner's share to his
Negro tenant for the period of the lease. Because of his persistent
advocacy of his Negro tenant's cause the white owner was expelled
from membership in the corporation and the market value of his
shares was returned to him. After concluding that the transfer of the
shares constituted prohibited interference with the Negro's right to
lease property, the Court turned its attention to the problems raised by
the expulsion of the white owner from the corporation. It concluded
that even though 42 U.S.C. § 1982 is phrased in declaratory terms and
lacks a specific method for enforcement, a federally fashioned remedy
should be available in state court, including injunction if the state
court possessed injunctive powers. The consequence was that the white
owner was entitled to both compensatory damages and injunctive
relief.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan, in which the Chief Justice
and Justice White joined, serves to warn that a reconstituted court
may not pursue the logical implications of Sullivan in a suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 to remedy racial discrimination in employment. But
if those logical implications are pursued, they lead to the availability
of both compensatory damages and equitable relief. 99 The relief available should be equal to that available under Title VII, and it may be
obtained through suits instituted in state courts.
In addition, however, there is available another remedy to one injured because of his active role in advocating and asserting the civil
rights of another, a remedy not provided by Title VII. One of the
primary sources of racial discrimination in employment has been the
use of the exclusive union hiring hall arrangements. 10 0 Where a union
with such a contractual arrangement currently discriminates, or where
having previously discriminated it dispatches employees to employment
in order of their length of service in the trade, the consequence is

99. See id. at 238-40.
100. An exclusive union hiring ball arrangement is one by which an employer undertakes to obtain all new employees from a hiring hall operated by the union with which
he has a collective bargaining agreement. For illustrative cases, see United States v. Sheet
Metal Workers Local 53, Heat and Frost I. & A. Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047
(5th Cir. 1969); Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1968).
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discrimination in employment even by employers who have no desire
to discriminate or who actively desire to eliminate discrimination.
Considering that shortages of qualified employees may result in expensive overtime operations, many employers also have an economic
interest in ensuring that the factor of race is not used to produce an
artificial shortage of labor. Until recently, whether the motivation was
economic, an interest in civil rights, or the prod of the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance, the employer who departed from his commitment to obtain employees only from the union hiring hall faced not
only the possibility of a damage claim but the threat of a strike by a
union of employees. 10 ' He also faced the risk that his action in breach
of the contractual undertaking would be declared to constitute a refusal
to bargain, subject to the remedial action of the National Labor Relations Board. 10 2 If the logical implications of Sullivan are followed,
an employer who can show that adherence to an exclusive union hiring
hall arrangement results in racial discrimination will be provided with
both a defense to any damage claim or unfair labor practice charge
filed against him and an affirmative claim for damages for any economic
harm imposed upon him because he undertook to assist racial minorities in obtaining their rights to employment. Conceivably, despite the
provisions of the Norris La Guardia Act, he would also be entitled to
injunctive relief against any strike called to protest his action. 10 8
101. Whether there would be contractual restraints upon strike action by the union
would depend upon whether the collective bargaining agreement contained a no-strike
clause or an abitration clause from which an agreement not to strike over the contract
violation could be implied. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95
(1962). Even if it contained one or both of these provisions, there would still remain
the question of whether the employer's departure from the hiring hall arrangement
would justify repudiation of the agreement or the no strike obligations of the union.
CJ. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S-254, 265 (1962);
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Lodge 751,
IA.M., 188 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1951).
102. CJ. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967); Unit Drop Forge
Div., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 68 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1968).
103. Cf. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), holding
the provisions of the Norris La Guardia Act inapplicable to suits to enjoin strikes in
violation of a no-strike obligation under a collective bargaining agreement providing for
final and binding arbitration of disputes giving rise to the strike. Certainly the interest
in eliminating racial discrimination from employment is of an importance equal to the
policy of encouraging arbitration of labor disputes which was sufficient to work an accommodation of the language of the Norris La Guardia Act. Indeed, it has been held in
other contexts that the Norris La Guardia Act does not preclude the issuance of an injunction to prevent racial discrimination in employment. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 US. 768, 774 (1952).
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III. THE UNION'S DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
It may be possible to obtain relief from racial discrimination in
employment through suit against a union for breach of its duty of fair
representation. The duty is one which developed as an incident of the
representative status conferred upon bargaining representatives by the
Railway Labor Act'04 and the National Labor Relations Act.105 Its
judicial origins have more recently been acknowledged. 106 The duty
established prohibits a union from discriminating among the employees
whom it represents upon grounds which are "irrelevant and invidious."
The duty of fair representation extends not only to the negotiation of
the substantive terms of a collective bargaining agreement, but also to
its administration, including the use of the grievance and arbitration
procedures established by the agreement.17 While there is difficulty
in other contexts in determining what factors may be characterized as
"irrelevant and invidious," there can be no doubt that racial discrimination bargained for or agreed to by a bargaining representative constitutes such discrimination.
Suits based upon the duty of fair representation may be brought in
either federal or state courts. 0 Because there is no statute of limitations specifically applicable to such suits, the governing limitation
period would be that provided by an appropriate state statute of
limitations. 0 9 Such a suit has the advantages of not involving the time
consuming resort to the E.E.O.C., and avoiding the short limitation
periods of Title VII, but, as compared with an action under that Act,
it must be recognized that attorneys' fees and all other expenses of
preparation of a suit based on the duty of fair representation will be
the responsibility of the plaintiffs, as in civil litigation generally.
The relief generally available in such a suit is limited by the fact
that the suit must be brought against a union for action taken in its
capacity as a bargaining representative, with remedies limited to those
appropriate for redressing harm done by the union or for preventing

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1956).
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 181 (1967).
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
See cases cited in note 97, supra.
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recurrence of such breaches in the future. 10 However, a theoretical
basis of the duty of fair representation may provide an independent
and valuable remedy against the racial discrimination frequently
associated with exclusive union hiring hall arrangements. As mentioned
above and frequently demonstrated in the cases,"' if a union which is
the exclusive source of employees for an industry or trade discriminates, or previously discriminated, on the basis of race in making
referrals to work, the consequence of referrals in the order of seniority
is discrimination in employment even though employers have no desire
to discriminate. The present or former victims of discrimination continue to be the last persons referred to work and the first persons laidoff.
One of the leading cases involving the duty of fair representation
involved a challenge by Negro porters to a bargaining agreement made
between a railroad and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, then
an all white union." 2 The Brotherhood had persuaded the railroad
employers to assign to the white trainmen all the work formerly performed by the Negro porters. The Supreme Court held that the Negro
porters were entitled to protection against the threatened loss of work
even though they were not represented by the Brotherhood because
"[b]argaining agents who enjoy the advantages of the Railway Labor
Act must execute their trust without lawless invasions of the rights of
other workers."" 3 This is so because "Congress has seen fit to clothe
the bargaining representative with power comparable to those possessed
by a legislative body ....
" 4 The law thus "imposes upon the statutory
representative of a craft at least as exacting a duty to protect equally
the interests of a craft as the Constitution imposes upon a legislature
to give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates.""" The employer is neither bound by nor permitted to take

110. For discouraging reports on the effectiveness of suits based upon the duty of fair
representation, see Herring, The "Fair Representation" Doctrine: An Effective Weapon
Against Union Racial Discrimination?,24 MD. L. Rav. 113 (1964); Sovern, Racial Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act: The Brave New World of Miranda,

N.Y.U.

SIXTEENTH ANNuAL CoNFERmcE oN LABOR

3-6 (1963).

111. See text at note 100, supra.
112. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
113. Id. at 774.
114. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944) and Mr. Justice
Murphy's concurring opinion, Id. at 208.
115. Id.
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advantage of the agreement which the bargaining representative was
not permitted to make." 6
Thus the duty of fair representation would seem to entitle qualified
Negro workmen-those who could demonstrate their ability to perform
work in an industry or trade covered by an exclusive hiring hall arrangement between employers and a union-to an injunction prohibiting either the employers or the union from giving effect to the exclusive
hiring agreement if in fact it had the effect of causing Negroes to lose
employment opportunities because of their race. Denial of future employment prospects is no less offensive than loss of current employment
if it can be shown that a person is unemployed because of current or
former racial discrimination. Such a showing can be made, as is effecT
tively demonstrated in a number of suits brought under Title VII."

The concept that government may so clothe private parties with
governmental powers as to subject the private parties to the constitutional limitations applicable to government can, of course, be put to
work in other ways." 8 One recent decision found in the concept the basis
for enjoining a state government from letting construction contracts
in circumstances which provided grounds for a prediction that the
unions supplying labor for work on the projects would engage in racial
discrimination." 9 Another case held that such quasi-governmental
power was a basis for issuing an order directed to a union supplying
workmen on a government contract to desist from its discriminatory
practices. 20
IV. ARBITRATION UNDER THE TERMS OF A COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT
Upon occasion racial discrimination in employment may be remedied
in proceedings instituted pursuant to the terms of a grievance and
arbitration procedure established by a collective bargaining agreement.
116. Id. at 203-04.
117 See note 69 and accompanying text, supra.
118. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
119. Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967). Cf. Weiner v. Cuyahoga
Community College, 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1004 (1970).
120. Todd v. joint Apprenticeship Comm. of Steel Workers, 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D
Ill. 1963), remanded to be dismissed as moot, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964).
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At least 94 percent of the collective bargaining agreements in effect
between employers and unions in the United States contain a provision
for final and binding arbitration of disputes.12 ' Provisions limiting
discharges to specific causes or to the general standard of "just cause"
22
are found in over 90 percent of the collective bargaining agreements'
and in recent years there has been a sharp increase in the number of
agreements which specifically prohibit discrimination on account of
race, creed, color, or national origin. 2 3 Even without the more specific
prohibition, it is unlikely in most cases that an arbitrator would find
that race constituted just cause for discharge or other discipline of an
employee by an employer. It also seems unlikely that many collective
bargaining agreements will contain provisions giving protection to job
applicantsagainst racial discrimination, so that this forum will, in most
instances, be available only to persons who are or were employees
working under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the fact that arbitrators are generally selected by agreement
between the employer and the union and receive their compensation
from them, creates at least institutional pressures rendering the process
suspect for remedying alleged racial discrimination which is agreed
upon by both employer and union.
The availability of relief under the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement is largely dependent upon the willingness of the union to
process a grievance charging racial discrimination through the grievance procedure and to the point of arbitration. It is the union rather
than the individual employee which has control of the manner of
& 2 4 Morepresentation of the grievance in the arbitration proceeding.
over, the presence of an arbitration clause in the contract applicable to
such a grievance will ordinarily preclude suit in court against the
employer for breach of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
unless the employee can show that the union refused in bad faith to
121. BuREAu op LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T Ov LABOR, MAJOR COLLECTIv BARGAnluG AGREEmENTS: GRmVANCE PR0CEDELS (BL.S. Bul. No. 1425-1, 1965), summarized in
RmAmT ONs Y ARBOO 34-35 (1965); Basic Contract Patterns, 73 LAB. REL. REP.
301, 302 (1970).
122. Basic Contract Patterns: Discharge and Discipline, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK
35, 36 (1969).
123. Basic Contract Patterns: Antidiscrimination Clauses, LABOR REmATIONS YEARBoo
LABOR

34 (1969). Forty six percent of the current agreements in the study contained such a
prohibition.
124. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
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process the grievance through arbitration."2 5 But such exhaustion of
the contract remedies will not be required if the complaint adequately
alleges the futility of such a course of action because of union participation in the discrimination. 1 26 In those few situations in which the collective bargaining agreement does not contain an applicable grievance
and arbitration procedure, the individual employee would appear to
be qualified to bring his own suit in court for the alleged breach of the
collective bargaining agreement. 2 7
Collective bargaining agreements frequently contain limitation periods which require the filing of a grievance within a comparatively
short period of time after the occurence of the events giving rise to the
grievance. 28 The fees and expenses of the arbitrator are usually shared
by the parties, and they have averaged in excess of $500.00 in recent
years. 1 29 One of the possible advantages of arbitration is that the
parties are not required to incur the expense of representation by
attorneys, but if they choose to be so represented they each ordinarily
must bear that expense.
Arbitrators usually are empowered to remedy contract violations
by directing appropriate action such as reinstatement, advancement
to a job position improperly denied, compensation for lost pay, or
other appropriate affirmative action. Arbitrators' awards are not self
enforcing, and, if the party against whom an award is rendered refuses
to comply, suit must be brought to enforce the award. However, an
arbitration award is not reviewable on the merits, 13 0 and may be set
aside only upon a showing of fraud or gross misconduct. 13 ' The consequence is that enforcement of an award may be obtained in either a
federal or state court with relatively little difficulty.
125. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S.
650 (1965).
126. Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393 U.S. 324 (1969). For an excellent discussion of
this problem and of the institutional inadequacies of arbitration with respect to racial
discrimination, see Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 40 (1969).
127. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
128. Basic Contract Patterns: Grievances, Arbitration, 73 LAB. REL. REP. 301 (1970).
Seventeen percent of the agreements involved in the study required the filing of a grievance within five days after it arose.
129. Report on FMCS Mediation, Arbitration in Fiscal 1968, LABOR RErAnoNs YEARBOOK 675, 676 (1969).

130. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
Gunther v. San Diego & A. Ry., 382 U.S. 257 (1965).
131. Cf. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
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As mentioned above, 132 there is a danger that resort to the grievance and arbitration procedures available under a collective bargaining
agreement will be held to constitute a binding election of remedies,
precluding resort to the legal remedies provided by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. There is also a danger that resort to the
grievance and arbitration procedures available under a collective bargaining agreement will have the effect accorded it by the Washington
Supreme Court of precluding resort to the procedures established
1
under a state anti-discrimination law. 8
V. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
The National Labor Relations Act was enacted primarily for purposes other than that of preventing racial discrimination in employment. The findings and declaration of policy which precede the
substantive provisions of the Act speak in terms of relieving interstate
commerce from the burdens of strikes and industrial unrest and redressing the inequality of bargaining power between employers and
employees."3 4 The discrimination which it expressly prohibits is that
which encourages or discourages employees with respect to union
membership, engaging in concerted activities, and obtaining representation for the purposes of collective bargaining 3 5 Indeed, it was not
until quite recently that the possibility emerged that the National
Labor Relations Act might be utilized effectively and extensively for
the purpose of combatting racial discrimination in employment' 36
The case from which the doctrinal roots for such a program have
sprung was, interestingly enough, not one involving racial discrimination.
MirandaFuel Company" 7 involved a case of arbitrary and invidious
132. See note 59 and accompanying text, supra.
133. State ex rel. Barb Restaurants v. State Board Against Discrimination, 73 Wn. 2d
870, 441 P.2d 526 (1968).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), (b)(2) (1964).
136. The pioneering suggestion that the Act could be so used is found in Sovern, The
National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,62 CoLvm. L. Ray. 563 (1962).
For a current and comprehensive review of developments under the National Labor Relations Act, see Boyce, Racial Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act, 65
Nw. U.L. REV. 232 (1970).

137. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), supplementing 125 N.L.R.B. 454 (1959).
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discrimination practiced by a union and an employer against a white
employee. A divided NLRB decided that Section 7 of the Act' gave
employees the right to be free of such discrimination by an exclusive
bargaining agent, and that violation of that right by a union constituted
violation of Section 8(b) (1) of the Act."5 9 In addition, it concluded
that employer participation in such illegal conduct violated Section
8(a) (1) of the Act. 140 The NLRB majority also decided that such

discrimination violated Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) of the Act
because it gave a foreseeable and prohibited encouragement to union
membership.1 4 ' The reasoning did not persuade the Court of Appeals
138. 29 U.S.C. '§ 157 (1964). It provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all of such activities except to the extent that such may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment
as authorized in section 158(a) (3) of this title.
139. 140 N.L.R.B. at 184-86. Section 8(b)(1) of the Act, codified in 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(1) (1964), provides:
§ 8(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein; or (B) an employer in the selection of
his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of
grievances ....
140. 140 N.L.R.B. at 185-86. Section 8(a) (1) of the Act, codified in 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (1) (1964), provides:
§ 8(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
141. 140 N.L.R.B. at 186-90. Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2), codified in 29 U.S.C
§ 158(a) (3) and (b)(2) (1964), provide:
§ 8(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-

(3'by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute
of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with
a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined
in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of
such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later,
(i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided
in section 159(a) of this title, in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered
by such agreement when made; and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in section 159(e) of this title within one year preceding the effective date of
such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of
such labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided further, That no
employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership
in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such
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for the Second Circuit, which denied enforcement." But in Local 12,
Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 4 3 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit found the NLRB's argument that refusal to process the grievances of Negro workers constituted a violation of Section 8(b)(1)
so persuasive that it thought it unnecessary to pass upon the alternative
grounds advanced by the NLRB in support of its order.144 Subsequently, the NLRB applied its theory that racially discriminatory
practices of a union violate both 8(b) (1) and (2) in a case which
has particular significance because it invalidated a "freeze" on acceptance of both new white and Negro job applicants at union hiring
halls.' 45 The reasoning was that the "freeze," though neutral in statement, had the effect of preserving a pool of white employees in a preferred position.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has developed
a theory which would give the NLRB an even greater role to play in
remedying racial discrimination in employment. In Packinghouse
Workers v. NLRB, 4 0 the employer had engaged in a program of varied
and pervasive forms of racial discrimination. The Court affirmed the
Board's order based upon conclusions that the employer had violated
Sections 8(a) (1) and (5) by refusing to bargain over elimination of
the racially discriminatory practices. It remanded to the Board for
consideration of whether the employer's program of invidious discrimination against employees on account of race constituted an independent violation of Section 8 (a) (1). The theory suggested to the NLRB
membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions
generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for
believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the
failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly
required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;
§ 8(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of this section or to discriminate against
an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been
denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic
dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or
retaining membership ....
142. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
143. 368 F2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
144. They were that such discrimination violated Section 8(b)(2) because of the
foreseeable encouragement of union membership and constituted a refusal to bargain in
violation of Section 8(b) (3). See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2), (3) (1964).
145. Houston Maritime Ass'n, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 66 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1967).

146. 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 396 US. 903 (1969).
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is that the effect of racial discrimination in employment is twofold:
(1) it sets up an unjustifiable clash of interests between employees
which tends to reduce the likelihood of their working together in
concert for purposes protected by the National Labor Relations Act;
and (2) it engenders in the victims of discrimination an apathy or
docility which inhibits them from asserting their rights against the
perpetrators of the discrimination. The confluence of these two factors
sufficiently deters employees from exercising the rights guaranteed
employees by the Act to constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1)'s
prohibition against interference, restraint, or coercion with respect to
those rights.
The theory, obviously an imaginative and novel one, may not survive Supreme Court review. 47 But if it does, it will provide a NLRB
remedy against racial discrimination by employers even in cases in
which unions have made no attempt to organize employees.
Use of the NLRB as a forum for combatting racial discrimination
in employment probably derives its greatest attractiveness from the
availability of a well organized and skilled staff which can be utilized
without great expense to the persons aggrieved. The regional offices
of the NLRB have experienced field examiners who will develop the
evidentiary aspects of a case once convinced that there is cause to believe a violation has occurred. Attorneys on the staff of the General
Counsel of the NLRB will handle the litigation of the cases at the
administrative level and will also undertake to obtain court enforcement of a Board order if the respondents fail to comply. Of course,
this free legal service is obtained at the cost of surrendering effective
control of the case to the NLRB attorney, although it is possible for
the aggrieved party to appear by his own counsel. 14 8
A six months limitation period is established by the Act for the
filing of unfair labor practice charges,' 4 9 but the willingness of the
Board to treat some discriminatory policies of unions and employers
as continuing violations makes it possible to attack policies instituted

147. For an interesting suggestion that the view that racial discrimination produces
docility or apathy is anachronistic, see Gould, Racial Equality in Jobs and Unions, 68
MIcHr. L. REv. 237, 238 (1969).
148. NLRB Rules and Regulations, Series 8, 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.8, 10238 (1970).
149. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964).
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at an earlier time.'5 The NLRB does not require a party filing a charge
alleging racial discrimination to invoke the conciliation procedures of
the E.E.O.C. before processing the charge.' 15 That source of delay
may therefore be avoided.
The range of relief available from the NLRB includes orders direct5 2 the processing
ing reinstatement, hiring, compensation for pay lost,"
of grievances through arbitration," and other appropriate affirmative
relief. Compliance with continuing obligations established in NLRB
orders can be obtained through contempt proceedings in the Court of
Appeals which enforced the order, but initiation of those contempt
proceedings is controlled by the NLRB and not by the charging
54
party.'
As one commentator has noted,' 55 a general counsel unsympathetic
to the Miranda Fuel doctrine could effectively terminate the NLRB's
role in combatting racial discrimination in employment. The general
counsel has what at least in practice has been an unreviewable discretion to determine in which cases complaints shall be issued, 50 and the
party who files a charge must persuade the general counsel and his
staff that the case is one deserving of attention. Moreover, even if the
general counsel is favorable, the three to two majority upon which
MirandaFuel rests may be destroyed with the new appointments made
by President Nixon. There are therefore current hazards other than
the normal legal uncertainties which attend litigation in relying upon
the N LRB for a remedy against racial discrimination in employment.
VI. THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE
The office of Federal Contract Compliance and its Philadelphia,
Cleveland, Chicago, and "hometown" plans have received a great
150. See, e.g., Houston Maritime As'n, Inc., 168 N.L.R. No. 83, 66 L.R.R.M. 1337
(1967). But cf. Local 1424, I.A.M. v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960).
151. See Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1133 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Local 12, U.R.W., 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 321 (1964).

152. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
153. See, e.g., Local 12, U.R.W., 150 N.L.R.3. 312, 322 (1964).
154. Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 US. 261 (1940).
155. Boyce, Racial Discriminationand the National Labor Relations Act, 65 Nw. U.L.
REv. 232, 257 (1970).
156. Teamsters Local 282 v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1964); Dunn v. Retail
Clerks, Local 1529, 307 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1962); Hourihan v. NLRE, 201 F.2d 187
(D.C. Cir. 1952); Retail Clerks Local 954 v. Rothman, 298 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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amount of publicity in the last year. The Office was established in the
Department of Labor pursuant to Executive Order 11246,157 issued by
President Johnson on September 24, 1965, amending Executive Order
10925,158 which had earlier been issued by President Kennedy on

March 6, 1961. Government contracts and subcontracts for more than
$10,000 must include an equal opportunity clause, obligating the contractor to abstain from discrimination upon the grounds of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin. 15 9 Generally speaking, employers with
more than 50 employees holding government contracts or first tier subcontracts in excess of $50,000 must file compliance reports annually
with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance or its designated compliance agency. 160 The equal opportunity clause, in addition to prohibiting discrimination, requires a contractor to advertise that it pursues a
non-discriminatory employment policy, to notify each union with which
the contractor has a collective bargaining agreement of its obligations
under Executive Order 11246, and to furnish all information required
by the Executive Order or the rules and regulations issued pursuant
thereto by the Secretary of Labor. The clause further provides for
cancellation of the contract if the contractor fails to comply with its
requirements.""Any employee of a contractor or any applicant for employment by
a contractor may file with the Director of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance a complaint charging discrimination in violation of
the equal employment opportunity clause. Such a complaint should be
filed within 180 days from the date the alleged discrimination occurred. 62 The government agency which is a party to the contract, or
its designated compliance agency, then conducts an investigation of
the complaint, and if a violation of the clause is found an attempt will
be made to resolve the matter informally. 6 3 The primary sanctions for
enforcement of the equal opportunity clause are those of contract cancellation and debarment from future government contract awards.
Formal hearings will be held upon the request of a contractor prior to
157. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1967).
158. 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961). Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1964).
159. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.4, 60-1.5 (1969).
160. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7 (1970).
161. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.4 (1970).
162. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.21, 60-1.22. (1970).
163. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.24 (1970).
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164
contract cancellation or debarment from future contract awards.
The coercive powers thus available may be used to obtain an informal
settlement favorable to the individual complainant, but the activities
and operations of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance are probably more accurately viewed as designed to produce institutional
changes rather than to serve as the means for obtaining relief in specific
cases for particular individuals. What case authority there is suggests
that there is no private right of action under Executive Order 11246.15
Currently, the most controversial aspect of the operations of the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance is found in the action it has
taken pursuant to the power granted it to establish pre-award compliance reviews. 66 The "Philadelphia Plan," for example, establishes
a policy against awarding contracts for more than $500,000 unless the
contractor submits an acceptable affirmative action program including
specific goals of minority manpower utilization in certain of the building construction trades. Specific goals for employment of racial minorities establish ranges of employment of racial minorities expected
within future years. 6 7 The goals as formulated differ from quotas in
that contractors actively and affirmatively seeking to reach the goal
satisfy the requirements of the plan, whereas quotas would require that
actual employment of whites be limited so as to provide employment
for a stated proportion of racial minorities in the work force whether
or not such employees were actually available. The Philadelphia plan
has survived its first legal test. 68

VII.

STATE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION AGENCIES

An attempt to discuss in detail the numerous state laws prohibiting
racial discrimination in employment would unduly lengthen this arti-

164. 41 CF.R. § 60-1.26 (1970).

165. Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
934 (1970).
166. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.29 (1970).
167. Department of Labor, Memorandum on Order Amending the Philadelphia: Plan,
June 27, 1969; Director of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, Guidelines on
Establishment of Ranges for Implementation of the Revised Philadelphia Plan, September 23, 1969. A history of the development of the Philadelphia Plan and a spirited defense of its legality is presented in Jones, The Bugaboo of Employment Quota, 1970
Wis L. R v. 341.
168. Contractors Ass'n v. Shultz, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.l. Pa. 1970).
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cle. 6 9 Every state in the Union except those in the South have laws
designed to prevent racial discrimination in employment. 7 0 Such laws
are not considered to impose an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce nor have federal laws such as the National Labor Relations
Act or the Railway Labor Act pre-empted the field. 7 Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains an express savings clause to ensure
the continued validity of state laws against discrimination.'
The requirement that the E.E.O.C. defer to state agencies for a period of 60
days after the commencement of proceedings under state laws has, as
discussed above, 7a been productive of difficulties. The common provision of state laws prohibiting an employer from maintaining records
showing the race of job applicants or employees has also created
difficulties of proof for proceedings brought under federal laws because
employers do not have records which might provide a statistical basis
supporting a conclusion that such racial imbalance as might exist
could not have occurred without discrimination. 4 State laws and
state agencies do, however, provide another important means of remedying racial discrimination in employment.
The Washington State Board Against Discrimination is representative of many of the state agencies empowered to deal with racial discrimination. It is authorized to deal with racially discriminatory
conduct of employers, labor unions, employment agencies, and other
persons who might participate in racial discrimination in employ75
ment.Y
A complaint concerning the unfair practice of racial discrimination must be filed with the Board within six months after the alleged
76
act of discrimination occurredY.
The Board must attempt to eliminate
the unfair practice by conference, conciliation, and persuasion. 7 7 Only

169. A comprehensive survey of state laws is contained in Bonfield, The Substance of
American Fair Employment Practices Legislation, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 907, 62 Nw. U.L.
R-v. 19 (1967).
170. A convenient tabular presentation with references to the particular state laws
may be found in BNA LRX 398-99.
171. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, 372 U.S. 714
(1963). Cf. Vaca v. Sipes,, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1964).
173. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text, supra.
174. See Garfinkel & Cahn, Racial-Religiou's Designations,PreferentialHiring and Fair
Employment Practice Commissions, 20 LAB. L.J. 357, 363-68 (1969).
175. WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.180-200 (1959).
176. WAsr. REv. CODE § 49.60.230 (1959).
177. WAsH. REV. CODE § 49.60.240 (1959).
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after there has been a failure to reach an agreement for elimination of
the unfair practice may the Board set the case for formal hearing
before a tribunal consisting of three persons appointed by the Chairman of the Board. 17 1 The practice has been to appoint to the tribunal
persons who are not members of the Board or otherwise employed by
it. One consequence is that the hearings have an ad hoc quality which
does not ensure a continuity in development of decisional law or the
development of an expertise on the part of those deciding the cases
which come to hearing.
If the tribunal finds a violation of the law, it may issue an order
requiring the party charged to cease and desist from the proven unfair
practice and to take affirmative action, including hiring, reinstatement,
or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay, admission or
restoration of membership in a labor organization, or other appropriate
affirmative action. 7 9 The Board does not have enforcement powers,
but must petition a superior court for enforcement of tribunal orders.180
The respondent in such a proceeding may also petition a superior
court for review of the order of the tribunal. 11 The decision of the
superior court may in turn be reviewed by either a court of appeals or
the supreme court, which creates the possibility of considerable delay
in obtaining enforcement.
The Washington Anti-Discrimination Law expressly preserves all
other civil and criminal remedies available to one whose civil rights
have been violated.18 2 The same section of the law provides that the
election of a person to pursue such a remedy shall constitute a waiver
of the right to pursue remedies under the anti-discrimination law. The
election of remedies provision has been given a broad construction,
barring the suits of employees for whom a union had unsuccessfully
sought relief in arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement
which contained no express prohibition of racial discrimination. 88 The

178.

WAsr. REV. CODE § 49.60.250 (1999).

179. WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.250 (1959).
180. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.260 (1959).
181. WASHr. REV. CODE § 49.60.270 (1959) makes Provision for such review. However,
it has been sunerseded by the state Administrative Procedure Act's comprehensive and
exclusive Provision for judicial review of decisions in contested cases. WAsH. REv. CODE
§ 34.04.130 (1967).

182. WAsHr. REv. CODE § 49.60.020 (1958).
183. State ex rel. Barb Restaurants v. State Board Against Discrimination, 73 Wn. 2d
870, 441 P.2d 526 (1968). For a different determination of a similar problem, see Cluett,

493

Washington Law Review

Vol. 46: 455, 1971

provision thus poses a problem of coordination with the provision of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which requires the filing of a charge with
a state agency possessing power comparable to those of the Washington
Board as a condition precedent to the filing of a complaint with the
8 4
E.E.O.C.1
Conceivably, under the strict election of remedies construc-

tion approved by the Washington court, the filing of a charge with the
E.E.O.C. would automatically deprive the Washington Board Against
Discrimination of jurisdiction to proceed with a complaint later filed
with it, thereby making it unnecessary for the E.E.O.C. to defer to the
State agency for a period of sixty days. In fact, however, E.E.O.C.
does defer to the Washington Board Against Discrimination for the
requisite period of time,8 5 and the state agency does accept and
process complaints during the sixty-day deferral period observed by
the E.E.O.C.
The Board is represented at tribunal hearings by an Assistant Attorney General of the state, and thus complainants whose charges are
believed by the Board's staff to be meritorious may obtain legal representation without the payment of attorneys' fees. The Board's rules
of practice and procedure will, however, permit a claimant to participate in a tribunal hearing as an independent party with representation
by counsel. 88 In addition, the staff of the Board, utilizing the investigatory powers conferred by the statute,' may undertake the evidentiary investigation and further reduce the expenses to a complainant
of proceeding in this forum. Of course, a real limiting factor is that like
many other comparable state agencies, the Washington Board is inadequately staffed and financed considering the size of the problem
confronting it.
CONCLUSION
This article has explored the forums and bases for relief in labor
discrimination cases. It has been written upon the convicion-paraPeabody & Co. v. Division of Human Rights, 59 Misc. 2d 536, 299 N.Y.S.2d 974, (Sup.
Ct. 1969).
184. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text, supra.
185. For a list of state anti-discrimination agencies to which E.E.O.C. will defer, see
BNA LRX 400.
186.
187.
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WAsir. ADninr. CODE §§ 162-08-261, 021 (1968).
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.140 (1958).

Discrimination in Employment
phrasing a recent statement of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuits--that law school teachers and practitioners have a duty to see
to it that the laws prohibiting racial discrimination in employment work
to make a reality of "[t] he ethic which permeates the American dream
.. that a person may advance as far as his talents and his merit will
carry him." Framed as a working guide for practicing attorneys to
whom victims of racial discrimination come, it seeks to encourage
attorneys to take their cases, recognizing that vindication of their
clients' rights need no longer be viewed as a call for unremunerative
public service. Thus it is hoped that incentives which have traditionally
motivated the bar to refine other areas of the law will likewise cause
lawyers to develop and refine laws prohibiting racial discrimination in
employment.
188. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (Sth Cir. 1970); Miller v.
International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 294 (5th Cir. 1969).
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